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Abstract
A reduction in the output of productive assets (trees) in some contin-
gencies may expand the range of risks spanned by the payoffs of assets and
allow for better risk sharing; which may compensate for the loss of output
and support a Pareto superior allocation. Surprisingly, if short sales of assets
are not allowed, improved risk sharing that results from the destruction of
output does not suffice to support a Pareto superior allocation.
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1 Introduction
In an economy with uncertainty and limited markets for the reallocation of
risks, the destruction of output may be Pareto improving. Typically, com-
petitive allocations with an incomplete asset market are not Pareto optimal.
A reduction in the output of productive assets (trees) in some states of the
world can alter, in particular expand the span of the payoffs of assets; and,
improved risk sharing may compensate for the loss of output and support a
Pareto superior allocation.
We show here that, surprisingly, if short sales of assets are not allowed,
improved risk sharing that results from the destruction of output does not
suffice to induce a Pareto superior allocation.
In a renown contribution, Aumann and Peleg (1974) pointed out, through
an elementary example, that an individual may benefit from the destruction
of some of his endowment: the change in the terms of trade in response to the
reduction in resources may be in his favour, and the benefit may compensate
for the loss of revenue 1. In a first-best environment, the individual benefits
at the expense of others 2. Our argument, here, is that under uncertainty,
an incomplete asset market and a ban on short sales, Pareto improvement is
still not possible; an individual may benefit from the destruction of output
in some states, but only at the expense of others; this, even though a Pareto
improvement would be possible if assets could be traded with no restrictions.
Our paper is not the first to consider economies with productive assets
or a ban on short sales. Santos and Woodford (1997) proved that, if traded
assets are sufficiently productive in the sense that the aggregate endowment
is bounded by a portfolio trading plan, then, pricing bubbles do not occur for
securities in positive net supply, regardless of the presence of sequentially in-
complete markets, arbitrary borrowing limits and incomplete participation of
households in the infinite sequence of spot markets. Demange (2002) proved
that, in an economy of overlapping generations with life-spans of two dates
and one commodity at each date, land and no short sales of land guarantee
the constrained optimality of competitive allocations. Lucas (1978) exam-
ined the behavior of equilibrium of asset prices in an economy with productive
assets and no short sales.
1Effectively, the agent behaves strategically, and, as a monopolist would do, he may
restrict supply to benefit from an increase in price.
2The argument is not unrelated to the transfer paradox in Leontief (1936) and the long
and contentious literature that followed. Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994) generalized
the result by showing that the distribution of welfare gains and losses resulting from the
transfer of resources across individuals is unrestricted; the same holds for the destruction
of resources.
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First, we give an example to show that the destruction of output can
indeed be Pareto improving when short-sales are allowed and, also, that
destruction of output can augment insurance opportunities when short sales
are prohibited. Subsequently, we show, in a general context, that destruction
is never Pareto improving under no short sales. Finally, we argue that, still
without short sales, an individual may benefit from the destruction of some
of the output of assets he is endowed with, even though this reduction in
resources is not Pareto-improving.
2 Example
In a particular environment, first, with unrestricted asset trades (short sales
are allowed), destruction of output may support a Pareto improvement; sec-
ond, with a ban on short sales, destruction never supports a Pareto improve-
ment, and this even though it augments insurance opportunities.
Dates are 0 and 1, and two equiprobable states of the world, s = a, b,
realize at 1; one perishable commodity, c, is exchanged and consumed only
at date 1; two individuals, i = 1, 2, have identical utility functions
U i = E ln(cis);
and two assets (trees), j = 1, 2, with identical risk-free dividends, equal to 1,
each in unit net supply are each held by a different individual; zij are holdings
of assets. Endowments in commodities are
(e1a, e
1
b) = (1, 0), (e
2
a, e
2
b) = (0, 1).
Since the assets have identical dividend patterns, no risk sharing is pos-
sible and, at equilibrium, there is no trade: the equilibrium is autarkic, and
the allocation coincides with the allocation of endowments augmented with
dividends:
(c1a, c
1
b) = (2, 1), (c
2
a, c
2
b) = (1, 2).
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2.1 Pareto improving destruction
If  > 0 units of the output of tree 1 are destroyed at state b, the optimization
problems, now different across individuals, are
maxc,z E log(c
1
s)
s.t q1z
1
1 + q2z
1
2 = q1
c1a = 1 + z
1
1 + z
1
2
c1b = (1− )z11 + z12 ,
and
maxc,z E log(c
2
s)
s.t q1z
2
1 + q2z
2
2 = q2
c2a = z
2
1 + z
2
2
c2b = 1 + (1− )z21 + z22 ,
with prices of assets qj and the commodity as nume´raire.
Since the asset market is complete, the economy reduces to an economy
with trades in contingent commodities,
maxc E log(c
1
s)
s.t.
pac
1
a + pbc
1
b = pa2 + pb(1− ),
and
maxc E log(c
2
s)
s.t.
pac
2
a + pbc
2
b = pa + pb2,
with ps contingent commodity prices.
The equilibrium allocation is
c∗1a =
9− 5
6− 2, c
∗1
b =
9− 5
6
,
c∗2a =
9− 
6− 2, c
∗2
b =
9− 
6
.
As → 0, the allocation approaches 3/2, the full insurance allocation. It
follows that, for small , destruction induces a strict Pareto improvement.
The allocation can be supported as a sequential equilibrium allocation.
Asset demands, by substituting the c∗ allocation into the budget constraints
of the sequential problem, are
z11 = −
1

(
1 +
9− 5
6
− 9− 5
6− 2
)
, z12 =
1

(9− 5
6
− 3− 3
6− 2
)
,
and, by market clearing, z21 = 1 − z11 and z22 = 1 − z12 . For 0 <  < 1 3 ,
z11 < 0 and z
1
2 > 1. To support the allocation as a sequential equilibrium,
3We assume throughout the paper that dividends after destruction are positive.
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individuals have to sell short. Finally, asset prices are computed from the first
order conditions of the sequential problem by substituting the c∗ allocation.
Remark 1. Here, it is the competitive allocation, following the destruction
of output, that implements a Pareto improvement. This follows from the
autarky that characterises the competitive equilibrium before destruction.
With destruction and improved risk sharing, Pareto superior allocations exist
generically; but, it need not be a (the) competitive allocation that is Pareto
superior.
2.2 Ban on short sales
If  > 0 units of the output of tree 1 are destroyed at state b, but, importantly,
short sales are not allowed, the optimization problems are
maxc,z E log(c
1
s)
s.t q1z
1
1 + q2z
1
2 = q1
c1a = 1 + z
1
1 + z
1
2
c1b = (1− )z11 + z12
z11 , z
1
2 > 0,
and
maxc,z E log(c
2
s)
s.t q1z
2
1 + q2z
2
2 = q2
c2a = z
2
1 + z
2
2 ,
c2b = 1 + (1− )z21 + z22
z21 , z
2
2 > 0;
the last constraint in each bans short sales.
There is an equilibrium with the following properties: the short sales
constraint on z11 binds, and z
1
1 = 0, while z
2
1 = 1; z
i
2 ∈ (0, 1); individual 2
insures against the realisation of state a (the bad state, for 2) by transferring
wealth from state b to state a, but individual 1 becomes worse-off relative
to the (autarkic) equilibrium without destruction of resources; destruction
introduces insurance opportunities not previously available.
The optimality conditions for z11 and z
1
2 , respectively, are
1
2
1
c1a
+
1
2
1− 
c1b
≤ λ10q1, and
1
2
1
c1a
+
1
2
1
c1b
= λ10q2; (1)
λ10 is the marginal utility of revenue at date 0; similarly, for z
2
1 and z
2
2 ,
1
2
1
c2a
+
1
2
1− 
c2b
= λ20q1, and
1
2
1
c2a
+
1
2
1
c2b
= λ20q2. (2)
Substitution of z11 = 0 and z
2
1 = 1 into the date 0 budget constraints of
each individual gives
z12 =
q1
q2
, and z22 = 1−
q1
q2
. (3)
4
Substitution of the optimality conditions (2) into the date 0 constraint of
individual 2 and rearranging terms gives
z22
1 + z22
=
− z22
2− + z22
or, equivalently,
z22 =
−3 + 2±√9− 4+ 42
4
.
For 0 <  < 1 only one root satisfies z22 ∈ (0, 1); and, it is easy to verify that
z22 <  and, by market clearing, z
1
2 > 1− .
Evidently, asset holdings pin down consumption allocations.
Finally, after substitution for q1 into (1), the optimality condition (in-
equality) for z11 gives
1
2− z22
+
1− 
1− z22
≤
1
2−z22 +
1
1−z22
1
1+z22
+ 1
2−+z22
( 1
1 + z22
+
1− 
2− + z22
)
. (4)
Numerically, it can be verified that, for 0 <  < 1, (4) is satisfied with
strict inequality and, as a result, the no short sales constraint for z11 is binding.
This result follows from the fact that individual 1, when short sales are
allowed, always short sells asset 1 and buys asset 2 for any 0 <  < 1.
Individual 2 insures against the realization of state a relative to the autar-
kic allocation, where there is no risk sharing, and benefits in terms of welfare;
in particular, c2a = 1 + z
2
2 > 1 and c
2
b = 2− (− z22) < 2. On the other hand,
individual 1 is worse off relative to the autarkic allocation: c1a = 1 + z
1
2 < 2
and c1b = z
1
2 < 1.
Remark 2. Destruction can augment insurance opportunities even in the
absence of short sales. Nevertheless, it cannot implement a Pareto improve-
ment; and this, at any feasible allocation, as the general argument that fol-
lows demonstrates.
Remark 3. Incentives for individuals to destroy part of the payoffs of assets
they hold are relevant, even if not the focus in this paper. Above, individual
1, who is endowed with asset 1, does not have incentives to destroy. In
section 4, we construct an example, with three states of the world, in which
individuals do have incentives to destroy – at the expense of others.
3 The general argument
Dates are 0 and 1, and states of the world, s = 1, 2, ...., S, realise at date 1
with probability pis; one perishable commodity, c, is exchanged and consumed
5
only at date 1; individuals, i = 1, 2, ...., I, have utility functions
U i = Eui(cis),
with cardinal indices that are differentiably strictly monotonically increasing
and strictly concave and satisfy boundary conditions that allow us to restrict
attention to strictly positive consumption allocations; and endowments in
commodities eis > 0.
Assets (trees), j = 1, 2, ...., J , in unit aggregate supply, yield dividend
payoffs djs > 0; the S× J matrix of payoffs is D. Investment in assets are zij,
while 1 > z¯ij > 0 are endowments in assets.
An allocation of assets defines an allocation of consumption, and we use
the term allocation to refer to either. It is constrained Pareto optimal if no
feasible allocation yields a Pareto superior allocation – constrained optimal,
since the asset market may be incomplete.
Destruction of dividends may increase the rank of D and, as in the ex-
ample, expand insurance opportunities as long as
rank D < J 6 S.
The decision problem of an individual is
maxc,z U
i = Eui(cis)
s.t
∑
j qjz
i
j =
∑
j qj z¯
i
j
cis = e
i
s +
∑
j d
j
sz
i
j
zij ≥ 0,
where qj are prices of assets; evidently, the last constraint bans short sales.
First order conditions are
E[djsu
i′(cis)]− λi0qj 6 0,
zij
(
E[djsu
i′(cis)]− λi0qj
)
= 0;
λi0 is the marginal utility of revenue at date 0.
A competitive equilibrium consists of an allocation and prices, such that
individuals maximize and markets clear:∑
i
zij = 1;
equivalently, the allocation is feasible.
Competitive equilibria exist 4; competitive equilibrium allocations are
4Magill and Quinzii (1996) is the definitive reference.
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constrained Pareto optimal, and any constrained Pareto optimal allocation
is a competitive equilibrium allocation for some distribution of endowments
of assets 5. As a consequence, we think interchangeably of competitive and
constrained optimal allocations.
An equilibrium with a ban on short sales is {zij, qj}. Subsequently, part
of the dividends of each/some assets in each/some states are destroyed: js,
with dividends reduced to d˜js = d
j
s− js > 0. Short sales on all assets are still
not allowed, and a feasible allocations after destruction is {c˜i, z˜ij}.
Proposition. Absent short sales, a feasible allocation following the reduction
in dividends cannot be Pareto improving, the augmented insurance opportu-
nities notwithstanding.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose {z˜i} dominates {zi}, that is,
∆U i = Eui(c˜is)− Eui(cis) > 0, (5)
with strict improvement for some.
The differential property of concavity implies that
∆U i < E
[
ui
′
(cis)(c˜
i
s − cis)
]
. (6)
We define the right hand side of (6) as Φi. It follows from (5) and (6) that
Φi should be positive for all individuals. Substituting for asset holdings into
Φi, gives
Φi = E
[
ui
′
(cis)
(∑
j d˜
j
sz˜
i
j −
∑
j d
j
sz
i
j
)]
.
Substituting the first order conditions for optimization at the initial alloca-
tion (before destruction) gives
Φi
λi0
= −∑j zijqj + E[∑j ui′ (cis)λi0 d˜jsz˜ij];
taking the sum over i and, since assets are in unit supply,∑
i
Φi
λi0
= −∑j qj + E[∑j d˜js∑i ui′ (cis)λi0 z˜ij]. (7)
To complete the proof and derive a contradiction it suffices to show that
the sum is negative that, in turn, implies that (6) is violated for some i. The
first order conditions at the initial competitive equilibrium, E[djsu
i′(cis)] −
5Diamond (1967) and, more abstractly, Radner (1974) give the argument.
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λi0qj 6 0, yield, after multiplication by z˜ij ≥ 0, summation over i, and since
assets are in unit net supply,
E
[
djs
∑
i
ui
′
(cis)
λi0
z˜ij
]
− qj 6 0. (8)
Taking into account (8), djs > d˜
j
s, and, importantly, z˜
i
j > 0 (which guarantees
that each term inside the expectation operator in (7) and (8) is non-negative),
it follows that the sum in (7) is negative. This completes the argument.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is straightforward. The change in the
welfare of an investor decomposes into two parts: one due to the change in
the portfolio he holds, and the other due to the change in the payoffs of assets.
By the envelop theorem, at equilibrium (or, equivalently, a constrained opti-
mum), the first term adds up to 0 across individuals. With positive holdings
of assets and only reduction in the payoffs, the second is non-positive for each
individual, each asset and each state. It follows that a Pareto improvement
is not possible.
Remark 4. The model incorporates the case of date 0 consumption; relabel
one of the states as date 0 consumption and rearrange the budget constraints
accordingly 6. Also, state-dependent cardinal utility indices do not interfere
with the argument.
Remark 5. A question that arises is whether Pareto improvement via the
destruction of output is possible when short sales are restricted, but not
prohibited: asset holdings are simply bounded below. It is, but the gains
converges to 0 with the lower bound.
4 Extensions: incentives and intervention
Even though the destruction of output cannot be Pareto improving if short
sales are not allowed, an individual may benefit from the destruction of some
of the output in his endowment. As in Aumann and Peleg (1974), an indi-
vidual can effectively exercise market power and benefit from the increase
in the price of goods that he supplies following the destruction of part of
the output. More interestingly, however, here, he can benefit from the insur-
ance opportunities the assets in his endowment offer after the destruction of
dividends. An example makes the point.
6Hens and Pilgrim (2002) give details.
8
Dates are 0 and 1, and two equiprobable states of the world, s = a, b,
realize at 1; one perishable commodity, c, is exchanged and consumed at
each date-event; two individuals, i = 1, 2, have identical utility functions
U i = ci0 + E
(cis)
1−γ
1− γ , γ > 0;
and two assets (trees), j = 1, 2, with identical risk-free dividends, equal to
one, each in unit net supply are held by individual 2; zij are holdings of assets.
Endowments in commodities are
(e1a, e
1
b) = (1, 0), (e
2
a, e
2
b) = (0, 1),
and ei0 > 0 date 0 endowments.
The quasi-linearity of the utility functions, equiprobable states, and the
endowment pattern imply that no destruction date 1 equilibrium allocations
are
(c1a, c
1
b) = (2, 1), (c
2
a, c
2
b) = (1, 2),
and for appropriate specifications of ei0, consumption at date 0 is positive.
If  > 0 units of the output of tree 1 are destroyed at state b, the optimi-
sation problems, now different across individuals, are
maxc,z c
1
0 + E
(c1s)
1−γ
1−γ
s.t
c10 + q1z
1
1 + q2z
1
2 = e
1
0
c1a = 1 + z
1
1 + z
1
2
c1b = (1− )z11 + z12
z11 , z
1
2 > 0,
and
maxc,z c
2
0 + E
(c2s)
1−γ
1−γ
s.t
c20 + q1z
2
1 + q2z
2
2 = e
2
0 + q1 + q2
c2a = z
2
1 + z
2
2
c2b = 1 + (1− )z21 + z22
z21 , z
2
2 > 0.
There is an equilibrium where the short sales constraint on z11 binds (and
in equilibrium z21 = 1) and z
i
2 ∈ (0, 1). Individual 2 becomes better off
relative to the no destruction equilibrium whereas individual 1 worse off.
Effectively, individual 2 has an incentive to destroy part of the output in his
endowments.
The optimality conditions for z11 and z
1
2 , respectively, are
1
2
(c1a)
−γ +
1− 
2
(c1b)
−γ − q1 ≤ 0, and 1
2
(c1a)
−γ +
1
2
(c1b)
−γ = q2 (9)
9
and for z21 and z
2
2 , respectively, are
1
2
(c2a)
−γ +
1− 
2
(c2b)
−γ = q1, and
1
2
(c2a)
−γ +
1
2
(c2b)
−γ = q2. (10)
Combining the first order conditions for z12 and z
2
2 from (9) and (10) and
substituting budget constraints and market clearing into them, we obtain
(1 + z12)
−γ + (z12)
−γ = (2− z12)−γ + (3− − z12)−γ; (11)
a solution z12 ∈ (0, 1) to (11) exists. Combining the first order conditions for
z11 and z
2
1 , we obtain
(1 + z12)
−γ + (1− )(z12)−γ − (2− z12)−γ − (1− )(3− − z12)−γ ≤ 0; (12)
(12) must be satisfied with strict inequality for the short sales constraint on
z11 to bind.
Individual 2 has an incentive to destroy if and only if
∆U2 =
(2−z12)1−γ
1−γ +
(3−−z12)1−γ
1−γ − 11−γ − 2
1−γ
1−γ +
z12
(
(2− z12)−γ + (3− − z12)−γ
)
− 1− 2−γ > 0,
(13)
where ∆U2 denotes the difference in utility between destruction and no de-
struction.
To facilitate computations, fix γ = 4 and  = 5 × 10−2. From (11), we
obtain z12 = 0.999194. The left hand side of (12) is equal to −4.67×10−2 and
∆U2 = 4.36 × 10−5 > 0. Moreover, individual 1 becomes worse off relative
to the no destruction equilibrium, that is, ∆U1 + ∆U2 = −3.285× 10−3 < 0.
The result is robust to different configurations of γ and .
The intuition behind the welfare improvement is as follows. Individual 2
insures by transferring wealth from state b to state a (the bad state for her)
and increases her date 0 consumption; she benefits from the higher price of
asset 2 (the price of asset 1 cancels out from the date 0 budget constraint
because z21 = 1 in equilibrium). Effectively, this is an economy with three
states of the world. Individual 2 becomes better off by transferring wealth
from state b to the other two states.
Remark 6. The incentives to destroy can be related to the literature on finan-
cial innovation: Allen and Gale (1994) and Carvajal, Rostek, and Weretka
(2012), among others. We consider economies similar to the two-date set up
of that literature. In particular, an entrepreneur (monopolist) owns two firms
10
that pay identical dividends in every state of the world (two states for sim-
plicity) and has preferences only for date 0 consumption. On the other hand,
two types of investors, that do not own any asset, want to insure against
future endowment risks. It is straightforward to construct examples where
short sales are not allowed and it is optimal for the monopolist to destroy
part of his output, that is, market value (date 0 consumption) is greater rela-
tive to the no destruction case. Destruction can be though of as “innovation”
in the sense that it “introduces” assets that can span more risks.
Remark 7. Finally, the suboptimality of competitive allocations when risk
sharing is restricted prompted Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) to de-
fine constrained suboptimality; and to demonstrate that public intervention
that employs instruments that do not augment risk-sharing opportunities can
implement Pareto improvements. The intervention, here, is effective precisely
by augmenting insurance possibilities.
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